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Abstract
Several studies hypothesize a relation between board size and financial performance.
Empirical tests of the relation exist in only a few studies of large U.S. firms. We find
a significant negative correlation between board size and profitability in a sample of
small and midsize Finnish firms. Finding a board-size effect for a new and different class
of firms affects the range of explanations for the board-size effect. ( 1998 Elsevier
Science S.A. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: G30; G32; K22
Keywords: Board of directors; Corporate governance
1. Introduction
Researchers in many disciplines have explored the effect of group size on
group performance. In corporate finance, Yermack’s (1996) study of Fortune
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2Bhagat and Black find a negative correlation between firm performance and board size using the
same measure of performance that Yermack uses, but using other measures of performance does not
lead to the same result.
500 industrial firms, partly confirmed by Bhagat and Black (1996),2 verifies
predictions by Jensen (1993) and others of a negative correlation between firm
value and the size of a firm’s board of directors. But many factors about firms,
ranging from the nature of the board’s role to the risk of bankruptcy, vary by
country (Gilson and Roe, 1993; Roe, 1994) and by firm size (Eisenberg, 1995).
Yermack’s results might not extend to smaller firms or firms operating in
different legal or cultural environments. Indeed, Yermack finds no consistent
association between board size and firm value for board sizes below six, and
recognizes that his sample, dominated by firms with large boards, is inappropri-
ate for testing hypotheses about smaller boards.
This article finds a board-size effect in a random sample of approximately 900
small Finnish firms. The effect, confirming Yermack’s findings, shows a negative
correlation between firms’ profitability, as measured by industry-adjusted return
on assets, and board size. A board-size effect thus exists even among firms and in
boards substantially smaller than those in Yermack’s sample. Studies of board-
size effects in smaller firms are of interest because the factors that drive the
choice of board size and structure in this class of firms could differ from the
factors influencing board size in large public firms. For example, small and
midsized firms are frequently closely held, so the influence of agency problems
between managers and owners on decisions affecting board size and structure
are probably less prevalent in this class of firms. And although smaller firms
comprise the vast bulk of firms (Cary and Eisenberg, 1995, p. 243), studies of
large firms with publicly traded securities dominate the empirical literature.
The inverse relation between board size and industry-adjusted return on
assets proves robust to controls for firm size, industry, firm age, and the change
in assets as a proxy for growth opportunities. Furthermore, the result is robust
to the endogeneity problem that arises if industry-adjusted return on assets is
a function of board size. We use full-information maximum likelihood estimates
to control for the endogeneity problem. We also investigate whether board sizes
increases as a consequence of past poor performance, but find no significant
relation between the lagged return on assets and the net change in board
size.
As a preliminary matter, the propriety of comparing U.S. and Finnish results
depends on Finnish boards being similar to U.S. boards. The mechanism by
which board sizes are fixed and the duties of board members are similar in the
two countries. In both countries, shareholders usually have the formal power to
determine the size of the board, though the board itself often exercises substan-
tial control over that decision. Finnish law states that the board need have only
one member, plus a deputy member, if the share capital is less than one million
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Finnish marks (about $200,000). For firms with larger share capital, the board
must consist of at least three members. Board members in both countries set
overall policy for firms but daily decisionmaking rests with management. And
boards in both countries are responsible for hiring senior management.
After explaining in Section 2 why board size matters, Section 3 presents the
relation between board size and profitability. Section 4 discusses alternative
explanations of the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Why board size matters
The literature discusses two main sources of the board-size effect: increased
problems of communication and coordination as group size increases, and
decreased ability of the board to control management, thereby leading to agency
problems stemming from the separation of management and control (Jensen,
1993; Yermack, 1996). The literature focuses on board structures in public firms.
Yermack’s sample boards have from six to 24 members, with few firms having
boards with fewer than six members. These firms’ large boards can make
coordination, communication, and decision making more cumbersome than in
smaller groups (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996).
If impaired communication and coordination were the only source of the
board-size effect, firms should be expected to adjust their board size to preserve
value. Jensen, however, offers a reason why such adjustments might not occur.
He suggests that larger boards lead to less candid discussion of managerial
performance and to greater control by the CEO. Thus, larger board size can
reduce the board’s ability to resist CEO control. Yermack (1996, p. 210) suggests
that ‘CEO performance incentives provided by the board through compensa-
tion and the threat of dismissal operate less strongly as board size increases’.
When the focus shifts away from Fortune 500 companies, one expects a
decrease in excess CEO control over boards. In small, private firms, little
separation of ownership and control presumably exists, with a corresponding
reduction in management-board conflicts. Thus, excess management control,
while offering a plausible reason for persistent large boards in large, public firms,
is a less forceful explanation for board-size effects in small firms. The board-size
effect might remain in smaller firms if communication and coordination prob-
lems apply to much smaller board sizes than those suggested by Jensen (1993)
and Lipton and Lorsch (1992). Interestingly, Yermack’s data (1996, Fig. 1)
suggest that the greatest loss in value occurs for board sizes in the range of five to
ten members, the small end of his board sizes.
A possible third explanation of the board-size effect relates to the composition
of the board. The proportion of outside directors is likely to be positively
correlated with board size (Yermack, 1996, p. 191), and outside directors mostly
own negligible equity stakes in firms. Outside directors thus bear a reputation
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cost if projects fail and the firm encounters financial difficulties, while their share
of the gains is limited. This asymmetry suggests that outside directors have
a bias against projects with a high variance that increase the probability of
bankruptcy, even when the net present value of the projects is positive. If
directors own equity, the effect could flow in the opposite direction, since more
directors share the reputation cost; the cost of poor decision making is spread
among a larger group, thereby cushioning the effect on any individual decision
maker. Bhagat and Black (1996, p. 50) find that the median outside director
stock ownership is only 1% for a sample of 780 public U.S. companies,
suggesting that outside directors often want to avoid risk. This kind of effect can
also exist for small firms, whose outside directors might be bank officers
unwilling to take risks that could lead to bankruptcy.
Thus, agency-based sources of the board-size effect could diminish in small
firms with boards substantially smaller than Fortune 500 firms’ boards. Some
sources, such as outside director effects, might not diminish. Studying the effect
of board size in our new sample of firms not only explores whether the
board-size effect extends beyond large U.S. firms, it can also suggest which of the
hypothesized sources of the board-size effect are candidates for future study.
3. Board size and firm profitability
3.1. Data description
We first ascertain whether a board-size effect on profitability exists in our
sample of 785 healthy firms and 94 bankrupt firms. The sample of healthy firms
is a random sample drawn from the database of Asiakastieto Oy, a Finnish
credit bureau whose database includes about 120,000 firms, of which about
15,000 report financial data. All Finnish firms above a prescribed small size must
file financial data with the Department of Trade and Manufacturing. Financial
statements need not be filed if two of the following three conditions are fulfilled:
(i) the company’s sales are less than four million Finnish marks during the year,
(ii) total assets are less than two million Finnish marks, and (iii) the number of
employees is fewer than ten during the prior year. The Asiakastieto Oy data
include all Finnish firms for which financial data are available. Thus, the range
of firms in our sample is broad but the sample excludes very small firms and is
dominated by small and midsize firms.
Asiakastieto Oy randomly selected 838 healthy firms from its database after
we specified the approximate number of firms we wished to include in the
sample. The Asiakastieto Oy database includes partnerships and individuals, as
well as corporations. Since the board-size effects studied here are of interest only
for corporations, we exclude 52 partnerships and individuals from the sample. In
addition, a healthy firm with only one board member was excluded.
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The financial data are based on financial reports covering 1992 to 1994. For
each firm we use the most recent financial report available when the sample was
selected in March 1996. All data used in this study, except the prior board size
and two-year-earlier financial data used in Section 4.1, are from the databases of
Asiakastieto Oy. Prior board size and earlier financial data come from docu-
ments available at the Patent and Registration Office (PRO). Every Finnish
company is required to notify the PRO when the membership of its board of
directors changes. This is the same source that Asiakastieto Oy uses to construct
its databases.
The original sample of 108 bankrupt firms includes all firms that filed
a bankruptcy petition between July 1995 and March 1996 for which financial
statements prepared less than 40 months prior to the filing are available. As in
the case of healthy firms, the financial data in the bankrupt firms’ statements
cover from 1992 to 1994. The median time between the bankruptcy filing and the
day when financial statements were prepared is 32 months, the minimum time is
18 months, and the maximum time is 39 months. Ten unincorporated bankrupt
firms and four bankrupt firms with only one board member were excluded from
the sample.
We sample a higher proportion of bankrupt firms to ensure a reasonably sized
sample of bankrupt firms. Analyzing whether bankruptcy is filed as a function of
board size (among other things), one of our original goals, requires a representa-
tive sample of bankrupt firms. The firms in the database have an overall
bankruptcy rate of 1.6% and a simple random sample of all firms reporting in
a confined time period would result in the inclusion of very few bankrupt firms.
Bankruptcy prediction studies routinely encounter this problem. Such studies
often must collect data across many years to obtain a reasonable number of
bankrupt firms to analyze (e.g., Ohlson, 1980).
For the combined sample, 70% of the firms report data covering 1994, about
26% report data covering 1993, and about 4% report data covering 1992. To
ensure that combining the bankrupt and healthy firms does not affect our
results, we present, where appropriate, results for the healthy firms alone as well
as results for the combined sample. Where appropriate, we also use weighting to
account for the oversampling of bankrupt firms, though unweighted results are
not materially different from those reported here. We confirm our findings by
controlling for the different years covered by the data.
Table 1, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics about the sample firms. Panel
B shows their breakdown by industry. Board sizes and firm sizes are of particu-
lar interest. The sampled Finnish firms have median assets of 4.3 million Finnish
marks (FM) (approximately $800,000) and mean assets of FM 38 million
(approximately $7 million). Clearly, these Finnish firms differ quantitatively
from Fortune 500 firms. Their boards have a median size of three members and
a mean of 3.7 members. They are thus much smaller than the boards usually
studied.
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Table 1
Description of firm characteristics for 879 Finnish firms, 1992—1994
Panel A presents the mean, median, and standard deviation for the principal variables used in this
study. The data come from a random sample of corporations included in the data base of
Asiakastieto Oy, a Finnish credit bureau, for the period 1992 — 1994. We use the most recently
available financial data for each firm as of the time the sample was drawn. The mean of 0.11 on the
bankrupt dummy variable is a consequence of the oversampling of bankrupt firms, as reported in the
text. It does not reflect the true proportion of bankrupt firms in the Asiakastieto Oy data base. Panel
B presents a breakdown of mean and median assets and board size by industry. The industry
groupings are based on standard Finnish two-digit industry codes, with some regrouping of small
categories. Asiakastieto Oy’s definitions of return on assets and solvency are the ones commonly
used in Finland. Return on assets is (net income#interest expenses#change in reserves)/(total
assets!short term accounts payable and accrued expenses!advances), and could be labeled
return on investments. (Short term, non-interest-bearing debts are excluded from the denominator in
computing return on investments but not in computing return on assets.) Solvency is defined as
(shareholder’s equity#reserves)/(total assets!advances).
Median Mean Standard
deviation
N
Panel A. Firm characteristics
Return on assets 0.13 0.18 0.41 876
Solvency 0.23 0.24 0.45 879
Board size 3.00 3.71 1.52 879
Assets
(thousands of Finnish marks)
4270 37,936 380,618 879
Age of firm (years) 7.00 10.80 11.00 879
Member of corporate group 0.00 0.27 0.44 879
Bankrupt 0.00 0.11 0.31 879
Number Percent
of sample
Mean
assets
Median
assets
Mean
board size
Panel B. Industries
Agriculture, forestry, logging 8 0.91 6500 3579 4.0
Mining & quarrying 2 0.23 188,240 188,240 5.0
Manufacturing
Food, beverage, tobacco 14 1.59 19,275 13,804 4.0
Textiles, clothes, leather goods 12 1.37 14,342 4564 3.3
Wood & wooden products 32 3.64 186,840 9803 3.8
Metals, metal products, machinery 68 7.74 10,109 4990 3.3
Manufacturing, other 59 6.71 12,587 5374 3.5
Publishing and printing 26 2.96 16,958 4534 4.5
Energy & water supply 12 1.37 108,755 36,494 6.3
Building & construction 89 10.13 11,261 4841 3.3
„rade
Retail trade 116 13.20 10,953 4786 3.2
Wholesale trade 182 20.71 15,778 3330 3.7
Hotels and restaurants 21 2.39 4581 2804 3.1
Transportation 55 6.26 20,998 4643 3.9
Services
Finance & financial services 5 0.57 23,592 20,564 4.6
Real estate 18 2.05 366,040 4056 5.0
Management, legal, marketing
Other services
98 11.15 98,837 3271 4.1
62 7.05 8578 2787 3.9
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3.2. Regression analysis
The great majority of the firms in our sample are not publicly owned, so we
cannot measure their performance by market-based valuation data. Yermack,
however, notes that his findings about board size and firm value are mirrored in
firm profitability. We use industry-adjusted measures of return on assets (ROA)
to measure firm performance. We use industry median measures of ROA to
control for the effect of industry conditions and general economic conditions.
The industry median ratios used are calculated at the two-digit SIC level. The
residual between the firm’s and the industry’s median ROA should be a better
measure of managerial and firm performance than an unadjusted ROA.
The dependent variable is a square-root transformation of the difference
between each firm’s ROA and the firm’s industry’s median ROA. We define the
difference between firm and industry ROA to be DROA, and compute an
industry-adjusted ROA (ROA
adj
) as follows:
ROA
adj
"sign(DROA)]JD ROAD. (1)
Although we report results using ROA
adj
, none of the board-size effects reported
are a consequence of using this particular functional form for the dependent
variable. If we simply use DROA, the models would lose some of their explana-
tory power but the board-size effects would remain statistically significant.
Fig. 1 shows the mean and median values for ROA
adj
as a function of board
size. ROA
adj
decreases with board sizes ranging from two to six members. Like
Yermack, we find a negative correlation between board size and firm profitabil-
ity, and we find that relation for board sizes smaller than his.
Our Fig. 1 can also be viewed as an extrapolation of Yermack’s Fig. 1. His
figure suggests major declines in value for firms with five to ten board members,
and almost no effect among boards ranging from ten to 18 members. Our Fig. 1
extends the range of the effect down to smaller boards. Our data thin out for
board sizes above six members. Of the 879 firms in the sample, only 32 have
seven-member boards, 14 have eight-member boards, and ten have boards with
nine or more members. So the fact that the board-size effect does not emerge as
clearly in our data for boards larger than six (although our Fig. 1 lines do
suggest its existence in boards with more than seven members) does not conflict
with Yermack’s findings.
To test whether the negative correlation is attributable to other factors, we
model ROA
adj
as a function of factors that might explain profitability, as
measured by ROA
adj
, or board size. Board size ought to correlate with firm size
because larger firms probably need larger boards. We account for size by
controlling for the logarithm of each firm’s assets, measured in thousands of
Finnish marks.
Yermack argues that more-diversified firms are likely to have larger boards.
Boards of more-diversified firms may require more areas of expertise. A dummy
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Fig. 1. The relations between board size and mean and median industry-adjusted returns on assets.
Industry-adjusted return on assets is the square root of the difference between each firm’s return on
assets and the firm’s industry’s median return on assets, with the sign properly adjusted as described
in Eq. (1). Industry medians are computed using standard Finnish two-digit industry codes. The
random sample of 879 Finnish firms, 1992—1994, is drawn from the data base of Asiakastieto Oy.
Fig. 1 includes all firms in the sample. It does not look materially different if we include only the
firms that avoided bankruptcy.
variable for whether a firm is a member of a corporate group controls for
diversification.
The board’s quality can influence profitability. Boards with weak members
can lead firms to lower profits. One measure of board quality is the financial
performance of individual board members. We use the number of the board
members’ own personal payment disturbances as a measure of board quality.
The payment disturbances recorded by Asiakastieto Oy include several types of
debt default, including credit card debt, bad checks, unpaid bills of exchange,
unpaid rents to landlords, and unpaid taxes. Actions taken by creditors to
execute against a board member’s assets and personal bankruptcy filings are
also coded as payment disturbances.
Jensen and others suggest that a firm’s ownership structure can affect board
performance. In our group of predominantly small firms, ownership structure is
probably not widely dispersed but we have no direct measure of dispersion. We
can, however, indirectly control for ownership structure. Firm size is likely to be
related to the proportion of the equity owned by the firm’s CEO, the managing
director. Thus, controlling for firm size can also help account for differences
in the firms’ ownership structure. The firm’s age can also help control for
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics and correlations of variables used to model industry-adjusted return on assets
for 879 Finnish firms, 1992—1994
Median values, mean values, and correlations of variables used in regression model of ROA
adj
.
ROA
adj
is a square-root transformation of industry-adjusted return on assets, as defined in Eq. (1).
The number of board member payment disturbances is the aggregate number of defaults, late
payments, and similar defalcations of all members of a firm’s board of directors. The group dummy
variable accounts for whether the firm is a member of a corporate group. The change in assets is the
log of the difference between the firm’s assets in the current accounting period and the firm’s assets
one year earlier. The sample is drawn from the database of Asiakastieto Oy. Significance calcu-
lations use correlation coefficients for all variables except the group dummy, for which a t-test is used
*p(0.05; **p(0.01; ***p(0.001.
Median Mean Correlation
with
ROA
adj
Correlation
with board
size
N
ROA
adj
0.087 0.068 1.000 !0.167*** 876
Board size (log log) 0.094 0.161 !0.179*** 0.922*** 879
Assets (log) 8.40 8.46 !0.185*** 0.287*** 870
Assets (thousands of Finnish Marks) 4270 37,936 !0.005 0.074* 879
Age of firm (years) 7.00 10.84 !0.130*** 0.147*** 879
Board member payment disturbances 0 0.15 !0.004 !0.109** 879
Group dummy 0 0.27 !0.219*** 0.242*** 879
Change in assets (log) 5.85 2.38 0.168*** !0.029 871
differences in ownership structure. Older firms are more likely to have a more
dispersed ownership structure than younger firms.
A firm’s investment opportunities can affect profitability. Following Titman
and Wessels (1988), we use each firm’s change in assets from the prior year as
a proxy for investment opportunities. Since the database does not include ratios
of research and development expenditures to value, capital expenditures to
value, and depreciation to value, we cannot test whether the results are sensitive
to the choice of investment opportunity variables.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics about the variables used to model
ROA
adj
and their correlations with ROA
adj
and board size. Table 2 shows that
board size and firm size are positively correlated, as are board size and firm age
and diversification. Board size correlates negatively with ROA
adj
. Our proxy for
investment opportunities correlates positively with ROA
adj
.
Ordinary least-squares regression models using the variables in Table 2 to
model ROA
adj
suggest a substantial, significant board-size effect. But board size
might itself plausibly be viewed as an endogenous variable that should be jointly
estimated with ROA
adj
. And modeling ROA
adj
and board size as endogenous
dependent variables in a system of two equations yields different results, thereby
suggesting the existence of endogeneity. Since ordinary least squares regression
produces biased estimates in the presence of endogeneity, we use methods
more appropriate for systems of equations. We therefore report simultaneous
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equation models of the following form:
ROA
adj
"f (board size, exogenous variables), (2)
Board size"g(ROA
adj
, exogenous variables), (3)
where f and g are linear functions.
For each model, we treat board size (log log) and ROA
adj
as endogenous
variables and other variables as exogenous. The log log transformation of board
size is used to make the distribution of the board size dependent variable more
symmetric.
As discussed above, we treat a firm’s age and status as member of a corporate
group (group dummy) as primarily influencing board size. We treat investment
opportunities and board quality, as measured by board members’ payment
disturbances, as primarily influencing profitability. We explore models in which
firm size directly affects only board size and models in which firms size affects
both board size and ROA
adj
. We use full-information maximum likelihood
estimators to solve Eqs. (2) and (3) simultaneously.
Table 3 reports the results for six models, three of which include all firms in
the sample and three of which are limited to nonbankrupt firms. Table 3
confirms the relation in Fig. 1 between board size and firm profitability and the
ordinary least squares results. Controlling for other factors, board size is
negatively and significantly correlated with a firm’s industry-adjusted return on
assets. The results hold for both the combined sample and for the sample limited
to nonbankrupt firms. Nearly all models omitting and adding other exogenous
variables to one or both equations of Table 3 confirm the board-size effect.
Table 3 also shows that, as expected, profitability correlates positively with
investment opportunities (represented by change in assets) and negatively, but
insignificantly, with board members’ payment disturbances. In the board size
equation, also as expected, firm age, membership in a corporate group, and firm
size all correlate positively with board size.
Finally, the statistical significance of the cross-equation correlation coeffic-
ient, rho, suggests the propriety of using full-information maximum likelihood
estimation for the system in Eqs. (2) and (3) rather than an equation-by-
equation method estimation procedure such as two-stage least squares.
Bhagat and Black (1996) suggest the importance of using alternative measures
of firm performance in measuring board-size effects. One other measure avail-
able in our data is each firm’s industry-adjusted operating margin to sales ratio.
The operating margin is defined as earnings before taxes, extraordinary items,
interest expense, and depreciation. In all models tested, this ratio correlates
negatively with board-size but not always significantly. If there were reasons to
believe that cross-sectional differences in the incentives to use different ac-
counting methods influence our results, this ratio provides a more robust
control. Small and midsize Finnish firms have their greatest discretion in the
choice of depreciation methods and the operating margin to sales ratio does not
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depend on the choice of depreciation method. Inventory valuation methods
cannot materially differ because all Finnish firms must use FIFO.
The negative correlations between board size and firm profitability in the
different samples of firms studied here and by Yermack have implications for the
sources of the board-size effect. Our boards range from two to nine in size, with
a median of three members and a mean of 3.7 members. We observe declines in
profitability even for board sizes of three, four, and five members. These sizes are
below previously hypothesized optimal board sizes, though the hypotheses tend
to focus on larger firms.
The small sizes of the boards and firms studied here suggest that they lack the
same degree of separation of ownership and management that play a central role
in existing explanations of the board-size effect. In these firms, managers
presumably are owners. Thus, these small firms may lack the agency problems
that enable managers to pursue their self-interest at the expense of the firm’s
overall value or profitability. Owner and manager interests coincide, yet we
again find an inverse correlation between board size and firm performance.
4. Alternative explanations of board-size effects
The analysis shows that firms with small boards attain higher returns on
investment in relation to their industry peers. There are several interpretations
of this result: (i) communication and coordination problems apply to much
smaller boards than those considered by Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen
(1993), and others; (ii) board size reflects the evolving nature of the firm; (iii)
board size is correlated with board composition variables, and the composition
explains the results; and (iv) companies adjust board size in response to their
past performance.
Firms might increase their board size in response to poor profitability. A small-
er board, having proven itself to be suboptimal, is enlarged. Such behavior would
lead to a negative correlation between board size and profitability, but not
because of value-enhancing characteristics of small boards. If board size increases
after poor company performance, the cause of the relation between board size and
return on assets may be the reverse of that reported here. Increasing board size in
response to poor performance would also avoid the troublesome implication that
firms with large boards are throwing away value. Rather, they are seeking to find
an optimal board size. We start by exploring this explanation. We consider, as does
Yermack, whether companies adjust board size in response to past performance.
We then briefly discuss whether the board-size effects might result from the
evolution of the firm, which could coincide with changes in board size. As firms
mature, their boards grow. Such growth changes the nature of the board. Board-
size effects could be board effects unrelated to size. Board size could just be
a proxy for the changing nature of the firm and board.
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A third alternative explanation is a variation on the possibility that the
changing nature of boards correlates with board size. For example, banks play
a prominent role in financing small and midsize Finnish firms. In such firms,
larger board sizes may correlate with the presence of a bank officer or employee
on the board. In a growing firm, a bank officer or employee may be one of the
early additions to the board. If banks enjoy a senior creditor position such as,
for example, by having a security interest in the debtor’s assets, the bank officer
often has an incentive to avoid risky projects. If this is so, larger board size per se
may be less important in explaining the board-size effect than is the presence on
the board of a risk-avoiding bank officer.
4.1. Past performance and current board size
We explore the direction of causation by estimating regression models of the
association between past performance, changes in the board, and board size. To
analyze director appointments and departures we supplement the data used in
Section 3 by using the Patent and Registration Office data. We examine the
board of directors information contained in the PRO’s records for each firm for
which data are available for the period two years prior to the year of the
company’s financial data used in Section 3. Such lagged data do not exist for the
very young firms in the sample and, due to the delay between the end of
accounting periods and the filing of accounting reports, such data also tend to
be missing even for young firms that are more than than two years old. We find
the two-years-earlier financial statements and board change data for 423 firms
in our original sample.
Following Yermack (1996) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), we estimate
count-based maximum likelihood regression models of the number of directors
leaving and joining a company. The Poisson regressions used by these earlier
authors are inappropriate for our data because the events, board appointments
and departures, are overdispersed. In such cases, negative binomial regression is
preferable to Poisson regression (Agresti, 1990, pp. 42, 457). We also estimate
a Poisson regression model in which the dependent variable equals the change
in the board size (director additions minus departures) from the period two
years earlier. The explanatory variables for all models are the firm’s two-year-
earlier return on assets, two-year-earlier solvency ratio, the change in the firm’s
size, whether a new CEO was appointed during the two-year period, the firm’s
age, the firm’s board size two years earlier, whether the firm later went bankrupt,
and industry dummy variables. The earlier year’s board size should influence
appointments and departures because larger groups are more likely to suffer
departures or need replacements than smaller groups. Table 4 presents the
regression results.
Like Yermack and Hermalin and Weisbach, we find that poor performance,
as measured by two-year-earlier return on assets, is associated with higher levels
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Table 4
Regressions of effect of company performance on director appointments, departures, and net change
in board size from two years earlier
Count-based maximum likelihood models of director departures and appointments that explore
whether prior performance, as measured by two-year-earlier return on assets and solvency, explains
current board size. The original sample is a random sample of 879 Finnish firms, 1992—1994, drawn
from the data base of Asiakastieto Oy, a Finnish credit bureau. Prior board size and earlier financial
data are collected from documents available at the Patent and Registration Office. All other data are
from Asiakastieto Oy. The reduced sample size of 423 firms results from the unavailability of
two-year-earlier data for many firms. The first two columns present maximum likelihood negative
binomial models of the number of directors joining and leaving each company’s board. The third
column presents a Poisson maximum likelihood estimate of the net change in board size, equal to
director additions minus director departures. To transform all dependent variable values in the
Poisson regression to zero or positive values, a constant equal to the maximum decrease in board
size is added to the dependent variable. Ordinary least squares estimates without such a transforma-
tion yield substantially similar results. New CEO is a dummy equal to one if the CEO two years
earlier differs from the CEO at the time of our analyses presented in Section 3. Two-year-earlier
board size, firm age, firm membership in a corporate group, and a bankruptcy dummy variable
provide further controls. The conclusions do not depend on the addition of these variables and are
robust to excluding the industry dummy variables. A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that
a (the overdispersion parameter)"0 verifies the appropriateness of the negative binomial models
used for director appointments and departures. For both the appointments and departure regres-
sions, the probability that we would observe these data conditional on a"0 (conditional on the
process being Poisson) is less than 0.0001. Negative binomial regression therefore appears to be
better suited to these data than Poisson regression. For testing the hypotheses of interest here,
Poisson regression results do not materially differ from the negative binomial results we report. For
the change in board size equation, one cannot reject the hypothesis that a"0 and therefore Poisson
regression is suitable. *p(0.05; **p(0.01; ***p(0.001
Dependent variables Director
appointments
Director
departures
Change in
board size
Estimation Negative
binomial ML
Negative binomial
ML
Poisson ML
Return on assets (two-year lag) !1.208* !0.967* !0.008
(!2.540) (!2.115) (!0.087)
Solvency (two-year lag) 0.122 0.113 0.016
(0.485) (0.459) (0.329)
Board size (two-year lag) 0.159*** 0.188*** !0.040***
(3.773) (4.451) (!3.732)
Change in log of assets 0.021 0.036 0.008
(0.220) (0.391) (0.321)
Age of firm !0.017* !0.019* 0.001
(!2.120) (!2.407) (0.610)
Group dummy 0.023 0.014 0.015
(0.129) (0.083) (0.392)
New CEO 1.554*** 1.399*** !0.028
(7.653) (7.176) (!0.491)
Bankrupt dummy 0.347 0.460 !0.030
(1.404) (1.946) (!0.538)
Industry dummy variables for industries listed in Table 1 (not separately reported)
a (overdispersion parameter) 0.645 0.621 —
Sample size 423 423 423
Pseudo R2 0.147 0.140 0.012
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of both director appointments and departures. More board directors are re-
placed when earlier returns on assets are poor, but net board size does not
change. The Poisson model of change in board size also provides no substantial
evidence that board size decreases in response to past poor return on assets.
In the Poisson model, the net change in board size is negatively and signifi-
cantly correlated with board size. This is not surprising since the many small
boards in our sample cannot reasonably be expected to suffer a net decrease in
size; only firms with larger boards can tolerate a net loss in board members.
We conduct additional tests of the appointment, departure, and net change
dependent variables using many different combinations of explanatory vari-
ables. The size and significance of the coefficients on return on assets vary
depending on the model chosen. But none of the models generate results with
materially different implications for the direction of causation from the implica-
tions of the results reported in Table 4.
As an additional, albeit indirect, test of the direction of causation of the
board-size effects, consider the likely determinants of optimum board size. The
size of the firm would likely correlate with optimum board size, as might the
nature of the firm’s business. Therefore, if the board-size effects we observe are
caused by firms striving for optimum size, our results might vary noticeably
across industries. To test the extent to which our results depend on particular
industries, we run ordinary least-squares return-on-asset models separately for
each industry. The 17 industry-by-industry return-on-asset regressions for
which coefficients can be computed yield 12 industries in which the board-size
coefficient is negative, one in which it is positive but less than 0.001 and four
in which it is positive. None of the positive coefficients approach traditional
levels of statistical significance. If firms are striving for optimum board-size, one
might expect greater variation in the sign of the board size coefficient across
industries.
Like Yermack, we conclude that the evidence supports the interpretation that
board size influences current firm value, rather than the opposite (that past
performance determines current board size).
4.2. The evolving nature of the firm
Board size could correlate with performance because changing board size
reflects the changing nature of the firm. Boards of different size may differ in
their performance because increasing board size represents the addition of
outside directors and the maturing of young, previously high-risk firms. Board
size would then correlate with performance not because of the consequences of
size per se but because the board’s changing size reflects the changing nature of
the firm. In all of our models, however, we control, at least in part, for the
evolving nature of the firm by including variables for firm size, firm age, and
change in firm assets. Although these variables sometimes have explanatory
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power, controlling for them does not eliminate the board-size effect. We thus
find little evidence that the changing nature of the firm — from a young and
risk-seeking enterprise to a more mature enterprise — explains the observed
board-size effects.
4.3. The composition of the board
Board size might correlate with the composition of the board. In firms as
small as those in our sample, there is sometimes pressure to add family members
or relatives to the board even though such additions might not optimize value.
When a firm expands its board for other reasons, likely entrants are company
outsiders or a bank officer. If these board members have a negligible equity
stake, they have the incentive to avoid risk since they bear a reputation cost if
projects turn out to be unsuccessful and the firm fails. If the omitted projects on
average have a positive value, avoiding risk could translate into lower returns on
assets for firms with large boards. Banks bear the downside risk if firms fail to
meet their debt obligations. Thus, bank officers, acting in the interest of their
employers, have a particular incentive to avoid risks. Risk-averse outside direc-
tors and bank officers could translate into lower returns on investments.
Our data do not allow us to explore all composition-related reasons for the
board-size effect. We can, however, indirectly explore bank officer effects. Bank
officer board members are not separately identified in our data but a useful proxy
variable exists. The financial data reveal whether each firm has issued debt secured
by a floating charge. In Finland, the holder of a floating charge has a security
interest in the debtor’s assets that can be sold in bankruptcy, including the firm’s
inventory and receivables. The floating charge’s priority is limited to 60% of the
value of the property securing the loan. After the years covered by this study, the law
was changed to reduce the floating charge’s priority to 50%. In Finland, loans
secured by floating charges are issued almost exclusively by banks. Thus, firms that
have granted floating charges are more likely than other firms to have a substantial
relationship with a bank and to have a bank officer on the board of directors.
To explore whether the addition of bank officers explains larger board sizes,
we regress board size as a function of firm assets, firm age, the corporate-group
dummy variable, and a dummy variable that equals one when a floating charge
has been issued. Table 5 presents the results. It shows that, controlling for firm
size, age, and diversification, board size is negatively correlated with the pres-
ence of floating charge debt. If the presence of floating charge debt is a reason-
able proxy for the presence of a bank officer on the board or bank influence on
a firm, then increased board size is not associated with the presence of bank
officers on the board. Table 5 also shows that firm size, presence in a corporate
group, and age all have the expected positive correlation with board size.
The floating charge’s influence raises the question whether controlling for it
would affect our analysis of the effect of board size on profitability. In models
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Table 5
Regression of board size (log log)
Regression of log log of board size weighted to reflect oversampling of bankrupt firms. „-statistics
based on robust standard errors (White, 1980, 1982) are in parentheses. The firms consist of
a random sample of 879 Finnish firms, 1992—1994, drawn from the data base of Asiakastieto Oy,
a Finnish credit bureau. We are interested in whether bank officer presence on the board increases
board size, which might suggest that our board-size effect results from financially troubled firms
increasing their board size to add bank representation. Lacking a direct measure of bank officer
presence, we use the existence of the floating charge, an indicator of secured borrowing, as a proxy
for bank officer presence. The results offer no evidence that board size increases with the presence of
a floating charge. We interpret this as evidence that board size does not increase for financially
troubled firms due to the addition of bank officers to the board. In a regression that includes
industry dummy variables for the industries reported in Table 1, the coefficient for the floating
charge dummy variable is !0.048 (t"!1.975). *p(0.05; **p(0.01; ***p(0.001
Independent variables
Assets (log) 0.052***
(7.159)
Age of firm 0.002*
(2.566)
Floating charge dummy !0.082***
(!3.655)
Group dummy 0.090***
(3.500)
Constant !0.286***
(!4.916)
Adjusted R2 0.128
Number of firms 870
similar to those in Table 3 that include a floating charge dummy variable, the
profitability board-size effect remains large and statistically significant. The
board-size effect survives our effort to model the role of bank influence.
If the board-size effect is a function of outsiders and bank officers on the
board, it does not necessarily imply that owners of firms with large boards throw
away value. Rather, owners may choose a board composition that matches their
own preferences. Suppose boards with outsiders and bank officers make more
careful decisions. Following the Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971) definition of risk
aversion, owners of closely held firms with low initial wealth would prefer board
structures that engender a careful policy, since they are more risk averse.
Wealthier owners would prefer a board structure associated with more daring
behavior, for two reasons. First, the greater wealth reduces their absolute risk
aversion. Second, they are in a better position to diversify their investments.
Questions relating board size to board structure and owners’ preferences are
beyond the scope of this paper but are interesting areas for further research.
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5. Conclusion
We present evidence that a negative correlation between board size and
profitability extends to small firms with small boards in Finland. This extension
of previous findings has implications for the source of the board-size effect. It
supports the hypothesis that problems in communication and coordination can
extend to smaller boards and firms. It also suggests that agency problems at the
levels faced by Fortune 500 companies are not a prerequisite to the existence of
a board-size effect. The effect’s presence in small to midsize firms with small
boards shows that board-size effects can exist even when there is less separation
of ownership and control than in large firms. And if there is an ideal board size,
the board-size effect in our firms suggests that the ideal board size varies with
firm size.
In closely held firms, an explanation based solely on communication and
coordination problems would imply that owners choose suboptimal board
structures. Board-size effects thus may have different roots in small, closely held
firms than in large firms. An alternative explanation is that board size reflects
the composition of the board. Larger boards can consist of more outsiders, who
foster more careful decision-making policy in firms since the reputation cost if
the firm fails is likely to be high in comparison with their private benefit if
a project turns out to be profitable. The possible change in risk preferences
induced by the change in board composition does not necessarily mean that
owners choose suboptimal board sizes. Rather they might choose boards that
match their own preferences. Owners with most of their wealth invested in one
particular firm might prefer a board composition associated with careful deci-
sion making, while more-diversified investors might choose board structures
associated with bolder investment policies.
Although we suggest several sources of the board-size effect, the data do not
allow us to isolate the effect’s origin. Interesting directions for further research
include whether the board-size effect found for our small, closely held firms can
be explained by board composition variables not explored here, as well as the
interplay among board size, board composition, and the risk preferences of
owners.
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